Locke`s argument, however, seems to say something. He seems to say that it is simply irrational to receive benefits without expecting them to have a commitment in return. If someone gives me something, I owe at least some debt. The implicit theory of approval argues that the thing that is given is the protection of the state, and the debts that are due in return is obedience to the laws. Locke`s theory of the state of nature will thus be closely linked to his theory of natural law, since it defines the rights of individuals and their status as free and equal persons. The stronger the reasons for accepting Locke`s characterization as free, equal and independent, the more useful the state of nature becomes as an instrument of human representation. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that none of these interpretations claims that Locke`s state of nature is merely a thought experiment, of how Kant and Rawls are normally thought to use the concept. Locke did not respond to the argument „where there have never been people in such a state,“ saying that it didn`t matter because it was just a thought experiment. Instead, he argued that there were and were there people in the state of nature (Two Treaties 2.14). It seems important to him that at least some governments have been formed as he proposes.
The central question is whether a good government can be legitimate, even if it does not have the real support of the people who live under it. Hypothetical theories of the treaty and actual contractual theories will tend to answer this question differently. In the pre-Locke century, the language of natural rights also gained prominence thanks to the writings of thinkers such as Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf. While natural law emphasized obligations, natural rights generally emphasized the privileges or claims to which a person was entitled. There are significant differences of opinion on how to understand these factors with respect to each other in Locke`s theory. Leo Strauss (1953) and many of his followers took the right in the foreground and went so far as to place Locke`s position substantially similar to that of Hobbes. They point out that Locke defended a hedonistic theory of human motivation (test 2.20) and assert that he must agree with Hobbes on the essentially selfish nature of man. Locke, they argue, recognizes the obligations of natural law only in situations where our own conservation is not in conflict and stresses that our right to preserve ourselves exceeds all the duties we may have. Simmons (1992) presents another synthesis. He joined Waldron (1988) and Tully (1980) and Sreenivasan (1995) in rejecting the transformation model. He asserts that the references to the „making“ of Chapter 5 of the two treaties are not correct for the treatment model in the proper sense of the word.
Locke thinks we have property in our own people, even if we don`t make or create ourselves. Simmons asserts that Locke believed that God had rights as a Creator, but that people had another limited right as agents, not as creators. Simmons bases this in part on his reading of two different arguments that make the bait: the first justifies property based on God`s will and basic human needs, the second on the „mixing“ of work. The previous argument suggests that at least some property rights may be justified by the fact that a system allowing the acquisition of property without consent has positive consequences for the preservation of humanity.